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Developing Lines
Forgiveness anD Literature
by Michael Fischer
imagine a community where constructive dialogue across political, class, and other differences is rare. threatened by disagreement, 
individuals cluster together with like-minded believers, often egging one 
another on into taking even more extreme positions, usually against 
their ideological opponents. sources of information are selected to 
ratify existing views instead of challenging them. shielded from external 
perspectives, individuals stay stuck in anger, opposition, and resentment, 
recycling grievances against their enemies and spinning out fantasies 
of revenge.
Fresh insight into this not-so-hypothetical scenario comes from an 
unlikely source: recent studies of forgiveness, starting with sarah Beck-
with’s excellent Shakespeare and the Grammar of Forgiveness. resentment 
and the longing for revenge are definitively studied in shakespeare’s 
tragedies. Beckwith shows that the anguish in these tragedies runs even 
more deeply than feeling wronged, wanting to get even, and doubting 
that justice will be done unless one takes matters into one’s own hands. 
Hamlet, for example, feels not just outraged by his father’s murder but 
abandoned, trapped inside himself and radically on his own, unable 
to have his grief and sense of injustice heard by his mother, who joins 
her new husband in thinking Hamlet has mourned enough. When she 
asks Hamlet why grief “seems . . . so particular with thee,” her lack of 
sympathy triggers Hamlet’s angry response that he knows not “seems,” 
that he has “that within which passes show” (1.2.75–76, 85). Drawing 
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on the work of stanley Cavell and J. L. austen, Beckwith argues that 
such thoroughgoing loss of confidence in making oneself intelligible 
to others impoverishes the inner life it might seem at first to protect. 
Despairing of being heard, we end up feeling we have nothing to say, 
nothing, at any rate, that will matter. 
Feeling betrayed by his mother thus pushes Hamlet to the conclusion 
that his words and actions cannot reach others. But this conclusion 
exerts its own pull on him because it exempts him from what Beckwith 
calls “the terrible responsibility of having to account for yourself.”1 if 
incomprehension is a foregone conclusion, then there is no need to 
try making oneself clear to others and no obligation to find the right 
words. the pressure to explain oneself can feel “terrible” because of 
“the relentless exposure to others [it] entails” (p. 19): others who can 
ask more or less helpful questions, misunderstand, and be influenced 
for better or for worse by what you tell them. as Beckwith shows, shake-
speare’s tragic heroes in different ways flee this exposure and seek some 
measure of control over the give-and-take of human relationships—at 
great cost to themselves and others. othello is the clearest case of a man 
trying to wrench reality into his private fantasy, specifically his convic-
tion that Desdemona is unfaithful and deserves death, which overrides 
anything she might do or say. 
Forgiveness enters Beckwith’s account as a possibility that these 
tragic heroes resist granting or seeking. they balk at seeking forgive-
ness because it puts them at the mercy of unpredictable, independent 
others. these heroes find it difficult to grant forgiveness for much the 
same reason. offering forgiveness exposes these tragic figures to the pos-
sibility of change, in this case the change that can result from creating 
new relationships no longer structured around the roles of avenger and 
wrongdoer. Beckwith cites Hannah arendt’s view that forgiveness frees 
us from “the predicament of irreversibility”: “without being forgiven, 
released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to 
act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed from which we 
would never recover” (p. 2). Forgiveness, in other words, breaks the 
hold of the past and allows a different future to emerge for both parties. 
shakespeare’s tragedies show how the open-endedness of that future, 
its dependency on uncertain ongoing interactions with others, can be 
experienced as a terrifying loss of autonomy and control. 
Beckwith focuses on how four late shakespeare plays—Pericles, Cym-
beline, The Winter’s Tale, and The Tempest—embrace forgiveness while 
acknowledging the ongoing lure of resentment and revenge. she deftly 
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explores the cultural underpinnings of these plays, in particular the 
reformation reframing of confession and forgiveness as an individual’s 
relation to god unmediated by the intervention of priests or by partici-
pation in a public sacrament. Protestant skepticism about the efficacy of 
rituals and religious authorities put individuals on their own, accountable 
to one another as well as to their personal sense of god. shakespeare’s 
late plays explore individuals newly exposed and answerable to one 
another. these “post-tragic” (p. 4) characters refashion relationships 
and communities by accepting the reciprocity with others that earlier 
tragic heroes avoid. 
these characters are “post-tragic,” not because they bypass the bitter-
ness and disappointment that define tragedy but because they work their 
way through them. Pericles’s grief at the loss of his wife and daughter, 
for example, locks him into silence and isolation. He stifles his words 
because he cannot imagine any listener grasping his pain. His despair of 
being heard recalls Hamlet’s, but Pericles goes on to recover his voice 
in his reunion with his daughter Marina. More exactly, he and Marina 
recover their voices together, in conversation with one another, each 
one acknowledging the grief of the other. Like any relationship, this one 
will remain vulnerable to misunderstanding, mutual recrimination, and 
suspicion, but the reunion of Pericles and Marina shows how these darker 
possibilities can be counteracted, if not vanquished once and for all.
More generally, Beckwith demonstrates how shakespeare’s theater 
enacts “a search for community, a community neither given nor possessed 
but in constant formation and deformation” (p. 5). Forging “paths to 
forgiveness” (p. 4) is essential to that search because forgiveness turns 
our finally unavoidable interdependence into mutual growth. “the res-
toration of each person to him or herself” ends up being “inseparable 
from, intimate with” (p. 105) the restoration of broken personal and 
social relationships facilitated by forgiveness.
as someone who values the distinctive contributions of philosophy 
and literature, i am gratified by how this account of forgiveness in 
shakespeare’s plays dovetails with Charles griswold’s Forgiveness: A 
Philosophical Exploration, a remarkably thorough and insightful analysis 
of the subject. although Beckwith does not cite griswold, had she done 
so she would have found reinforcement for her key claims about for-
giveness in shakespeare, in particular the emphasis on the reciprocity 
that characterizes forgiveness and the transformational possibilities that 
forgiveness can unleash. 
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griswold’s account centers on interpersonal forgiveness, which for 
him grows out of a dialogue between a wrongdoer and his victim. the 
offender can initiate this dialogue by meeting several conditions: by tak-
ing responsibility for his damaging actions or words; by regretting the 
harm he has done; by seeing his wrongdoing from the point of view of 
the victim and the larger community and accepting their condemnation; 
by apologizing, asking for forgiveness, and vowing to learn from his mis-
deeds and not repeat them. these conditions are not discrete items on 
a checklist but interrelated steps that the offender must take. Crucially, 
the offender must express to the victim his remorse, his acknowledg-
ment of the victim’s suffering, and his commitment to change. the 
obligation to communicate with the victim underscores the offender’s 
respect for the victim as someone owed an honest explanation, and 
puts the offender at the mercy of the victim’s unconstrained response. 
By asking for forgiveness, the offender is seeking to rejoin the larger 
moral community and acknowledging his need for the victim’s consent. 
Forgiveness, in short, emerges from an exchange with the person who 
has been wronged, not from a dialogue of the mind with itself. intro-
spection is necessary but not sufficient for forgiveness to occur.
the victim, in turn, must relinquish any desire for revenge, commit 
to overcoming resentment, and trust the offender’s self-representation, 
including his expression of contrition and stated willingness to change. 
none of this is easy. griswold is especially good at plumbing the appeal 
of resentment or the simmering anger that can set in even after the 
administration of punishment. it can be difficult to let go of resentment, 
our sense of being wronged, especially when we may have come to define 
ourselves in opposition to the person who has hurt us. “in opposition 
to” usually means “as better than”: giving up resentment can entail sur-
rendering our reassuring feeling of moral superiority or, what comes 
to the same thing, admitting our kinship with an enemy we may have 
demonized. sometimes an offense can be so horrible that the victim 
cannot forgive the perpetrator even when he has taken every step to be 
forgiven. other times, however, an unforgiving victim can be faulted for 
being vindictive, hard-hearted, or stubborn. nevertheless, even though 
forgiveness can be recommended, it cannot be coerced without violat-
ing the victim’s autonomy all over again. there is never any guarantee 
that an apology will be forthcoming or accepted, and there will always 
be cases when “the threshold of what will count as forgiveness is not 
crossed; sadly and painfully, in such cases we are either unforgiven, or 
unable to forgive.”2
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But when one individual asks for forgiveness and another individual 
extends it, both are voluntarily engaged in a transaction that enables 
each of them to move on instead of staying stuck in what griswold calls, 
also citing arendt, the “predicament of irreversibility” (p. 100): “forgive-
ness does not reiterate the past but instead promises renewal without 
forgetfulness, excuse, or condonation of past wrongs” (p. 211).Both the 
offender and his victim are able to acknowledge—and remember—what 
happened between them without being forever defined by it. repaired, 
their relationship is now free to take many forms, from agreeing to stay 
out of one another’s way to friendship and even love.
although interpersonal forgiveness is central to griswold’s study, 
he also considers several closely related topics, among them political 
apology (the university of alabama, for example, recently apologizing 
for its historical implication in slavery). Political apology is especially 
interesting because it crystallizes what in griswold’s view we can hope 
from social life. at best, a successful political apology can enable both 
parties to gain trust in one another, resume or begin collaborating, 
and thereby begin working together to create a community aware of 
the acrimonious conflicts of the past but determined to outgrow them. 
this determination requires constant nurturing and renewal (griswold is 
rightly skeptical of facile talk of achieving “closure”). We remain fallible 
beings in an imperfect world where injustice persists and where we will 
continue to face opportunities for disappointment, anger, and disgust. 
But if political apology and forgiveness are not panaceas, neither are 
they a waste of time. they make possible moments of reconciliation, 
hope, and peace that may not “satisfy the soul’s deepest yearnings” (p. 
193) but that still allow us to rise above the “ongoing violent conflict 
and ferocious retaliation” (p. 193) that would be our lot without them.
as we have seen, shakespeare’s late plays also celebrate these moments 
of reconciliation, even as a tragic hero like othello adds to the “violent 
conflict and ferocious retaliation” that forgiveness can suspend. Forgive-
ness for griswold underscores our vulnerability to one another, which 
othello, again, finds unbearable. othello would rather destroy Desde-
mona than allow her to expose him to change (to paraphrase Cavell). 
But if the possibility of dialogue and empathy is fragile, it is still resilient 
enough to keep forgiveness alive. although othello’s violent resistance is 
a force always to be reckoned with, it doesn’t have the final say in either 
griswold’s account of forgiveness or Beckwith’s reading of shakespeare.
griswold and Beckwith converge on another key point. Both see lit-
erature as playing a crucial role in enabling forgiveness. For griswold, 
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forgiveness is bound up with the creation, exchange, and interpretation 
of stories. the offender faces the test of telling his victim a story that 
makes sense of his past wrongdoing and its impact on the victim, a story 
that acknowledges his deeds as his, while urging that he has changed. in 
deciding to forgive, the victim must not only accept that story but also 
continue his own story in a direction no longer dictated by having been 
wronged, though always remembering it. in the narrative exchanges 
that constitute forgiveness, the possibilities for self-deception and confu-
sion, as well as mutual enlightenment and growth, are endless and, in 
griswold’s view, “best left to literary description” (p. 106). in any given 
case, “much will hinge on just what words are chosen, why contrition 
was expressed at all, and so forth. Moral philosophy cannot provide 
guidance at that level of detail, and literature is much better suited to 
describing the particulars and their context” (p. 121), the context again 
being the complex interpersonal dynamics that make up forgiveness.
along similar lines, Beckwith finds “therapeutic and diagnostic power” 
(p. 9) in shakespeare’s theater. she points out that Hamlet’s pessimism 
about “outward” behavior expressing “inner” thoughts is “deeply anti-
theatrical”: “in dislocating the natural relation between words, gestures, 
and appearances, and ‘that within,’ the fundamental resources of theater 
are voided” (p. 33). shakespeare “lends his art to restoring the mind 
and soul to the face, and the process evolves theatrical forms in which 
reconciliation and forgiveness become central” (p. 33). theater does 
not simply reenact the pursuit of forgiveness, but furthers it.
an equally powerful role is assigned to literature in Jill scott’s A 
Poetics of Forgiveness: Cultural Responses to Loss and Wrongdoing. scott’s 
central contention is that literature and the other arts can facilitate 
forgiveness and resolve conflict. she arrives at this claim via Jacques 
Derrida, Julia Kristeva, and Kelly oliver. unlike griswold, Derrida, 
according to scott, argues that forgiveness must be radically uncon-
ditional and “aneconomical,” an irrational, “mad” gift with no strings 
attached or return expected. in its purest form, forgiveness thus defined 
is for Derrida impossible. We cannot in everyday life extricate ourselves 
from practical considerations, political concerns, and other interests. 
responding to Derrida, Kristeva reaffirms the irrationality and radi-
cal disinterestedness of forgiveness, but for her the gift of forgiveness 
comes from aesthetic activity. if forgiveness for Derrida cannot be imple-
mented, for Kristeva it is always available in the unconsciously produced 
ambiguities of poetic discourse as well as in the bottomless creativity of 
literary interpretation. aesthetic production, whether in literature or 
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criticism, unsettles rigid dualisms (for example, between offenders and 
victims) that try to fix meaning. as scott puts it, “the infinite possibili-
ties of creative communication” affirmed by Kristeva allow us “to start 
afresh and to begin anew.”3 Finally, oliver makes personal growth itself 
dependent on the “ethics of continual self-questioning” (p. 13) that 
fuels forgiveness. strengthening the tie between creativity and forgive-
ness, oliver, scott concludes, “takes forgiveness to a whole new level by 
transforming it from an instrumental means of overcoming a singular 
instance of conflict or wrongdoing into an ethical stance and a mode 
of being in the world with others” (p. 12). Forgiveness becomes “a kind 
of attitude or disposition, a way of being in the world” (p. 11) fostered 
by aesthetic activity.
i am attracted to scott’s conclusion that literature and the other arts 
encourage a way of coexisting with others akin to forgiveness or at least 
conducive to it, say by promoting openness to change and willingness to 
reframe what seems inalterable. But the theoretical support scott gives 
the link between literature and forgiveness seems shaky to me. she tends 
to repeat the ideas of Derrida, et al., instead of further developing or 
clarifying them. she supports these ideas not by arguing for them but 
by caricaturing the more performative approach taken by griswold and 
others. she notes, for example, that forgiveness “must be much more 
than a speech act, pronouncing: ‘i forgive you.’ in the most positive 
sense, forgiveness must start with the self, must be a practice of tolerance, 
understanding, and mutual healing, or even a mentality that pre-exists 
any wrongdoing” (p. 53). i cannot think of anyone who disagrees with 
this, not even the most ardent advocate of speech act theory.
the theoretical ideas invoked by scott recur in her book without 
advancing our progress through it, like speed bumps in a road. Fortu-
nately, the readings that these ideas punctuate rise above their tenuous 
theoretical support and make a better case for the role literature can 
play in inspiring forgiveness. scott thoughtfully discusses in a wide range 
of sources, from the Iliad and Kafka’s Letter to His Father to Quentin tar-
antino’s Kill Bill I and II; photography by robert Fleming (of postwar 
germany) and Kresta K. C. venning (from postgenocide rwanda); and 
the south african truth and reconciliation Commission. Her treatment 
of several post-9/11 novels is especially insightful. scott wrote her book 
in part because after september 11 she sensed that “resolution and 
reconciliation was quickly giving way to vengeance, at least in american 
foreign policy” (p. ix) and that grief was being “strategically leveraged 
to create a public discourse of justified revenge” (p. 168). she shows 
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how literature and the other arts can intervene in that discourse in 
constructive ways, making A Poetics of Forgiveness a timely, humane book.
the essays collected in The Ethics of Forgiveness return us to the view 
of forgiveness as a complex bilateral process as opposed to a pure gift. 
the book was occasioned by a conference on griswold’s work, and the 
contributors refine some of his key points, contest others, and address 
topics he leaves undeveloped, among them self-forgiveness, cultural 
influences on forgiveness, and the limits of forgiveness. although the 
volume as a whole exemplifies the care and attentiveness that makes 
griswold’s analysis so illuminating, two essays stand out.
in “Conditional unconditional Forgiveness,” eve garrard and David 
Mcnaughton revisit the legitimacy of unconditional forgiveness and 
conclude that in all circumstances, even when the offender remains 
recalcitrant, “there is sufficient reason to forgive.”4 they emphasize that 
forgiveness is still “a heavy and difficult task” (p. 105) rather than an 
easy surge of fellow feeling. even unconditional forgiveness must meet 
certain demanding internal conditions, which garrard and Mcnaughton 
go on to explore. although there can always be a reason to forgive a 
wrongdoer no matter how unrepentant he may be, there is still “such 
a thing as objectionably facile forgiveness” (p. 97), or instances when 
forgiveness comes too easily—a point that can be overlooked when 
forgiveness is compared to an irrational gift.
in “the self rewritten: the Case for self-Forgiveness,” garry Hagberg 
elaborates on how the literary imagination can inform self-forgiveness as 
well as enable forgiveness between individuals. Having hurt someone, we 
sometimes judge ourselves in the name of the person we have injured, 
someone we may continue to think about even after he has forgiven us. 
We can be too hard on ourselves in this judgment but we can also be 
too easy, for example, by minimizing the impact of what we have done. 
Hagberg carefully shows how calibrating the consequences of our actions 
or words on another requires “a kind of literary imagination, thinking 
our way with genuine imaginative sympathy into the experience of the 
injured” (p. 73), thereby internalizing the “warranted resentment” 
(p. 73) he feels. seeing ourselves from the vantage point of another 
is essential to our acknowledging what we have done. self-forgiveness 
is set in motion when we are able to resituate our misdeeds, releasing 
other possibilities in ourselves that we can then commit to realizing. We 
create the “person we want to be” (p. 79) in much the same imagina-
tive way as we take responsibility for what we did. aspiring to a better 
self, like regretting what we have done, takes imagination. as Hagberg 
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persuasively demonstrates, creating a better future while still recalling 
the past turns out to be “deeply akin to our engagement with literary 
texts” (p. 78).
i mentioned earlier how scott began writing A Poetics of Forgiveness 
in the wake of september 11, as she searched for an alternative to the 
reigning discourse of retaliation and revenge. in her acknowledgments, 
she observes that “much has changed in the world” (p. ix) since sep-
tember 11. anger has given way to “new optimism and faith in humanity 
with the election of the first black president of the united states, who 
has made clear his commitment to change of massive proportions” 
(p. x). she adds that obama “will have a hard time living up to the 
expectations of his electorate” (p. x). Her prediction has come true, as 
for many people optimism has yielded to frustration with the political 
stalemate i described at the outset: polarized groups nurturing their 
grievances (real and imagined) against one another and looking for 
chances to get ahead or get even. the books i have been discussing 
not only sketch an admittedly difficult path beyond mutual recrimina-
tion, they show the crucial role that literature can play in making that 
path possible: a major achievement at any time—but especially now, 
when political discouragement is exceeded only by widespread public 
skepticism about the value of literature and the other arts. thanks to 
studies like these, beleaguered defenders of literature may yet be in a 
position to make emerson’s words their own: “Patience and patience, 
we shall win at the last.”
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